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South Carolina Loses a Battle in the Hazardous Waste Wars:
Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to Invalidate South
Carolina's Hazardous Waste Laws in Environmental
Technology Council v. Sierra Club
Dear Jim:
We recently learned the North Carolina Council of State
rejected the transfer of state-owned land for use as a
comprehensive hazardous waste treatment and disposal
facility. By this action, it is apparent North Carolina will be
unable to meet the milestone dates set forth in the Regional
Agreement established with the states of Alabama, Kentucky,
Tennessee and South Carolina.
As you know, under the terms of the regional agreement
a party state failing to meet the milestones set forth will be
eliminated automatically. Therefore, effective January 1,
1991, if the permit milestone is not met, North Carolina will
be eliminated automatically from the agreement and lose all
its rights and privileges....
It is unfortunate North Carolina has chosen not to abide
by its agreement to shoulder the burden for their own wastes
and to share their capacity with the agreement states.
Hopefully, North Carolina and her industries are prepared to
suffer the consequences of this irresponsible decision by the
Council of State.
These harsh words from the Governor of South Carolina to the
Governor of North Carolina2 represent one of the most recent battles
in the "war" among the states over the disposal of hazardous waste
Approximately 214 million tons of hazardous waste are generated in
1. Letter from Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., then-Governor of South Carolina, to James
G. Martin, then-Governor of North Carolina (Dec. 17, 1990), Record at Joint Appendix
673, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991)
(No. 91-2317) [hereinafter Campbell Letter].
2. See Id.
3. See generally William David Bridgers, Note, The Hazardous Waste Wars: An
Examination of the Origins and Major Battles to Date, with Suggestions for Ending the
Wars, 17 VT. L. RIv. 821 (1993) (providing a background and history of the hazardous
waste wars that began when states with facilities began to resent "being dumping grounds
for the other states"); John Holusha, In Some Parts the Battle Cry Is "Don't Dump on
Me," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,1991, § 4, at 5 (describing the growing garbage problem and the
escalating "interstate war").
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the United States each year The State of South Carolina imports
over 138,000 tons of hazardous waste per year, and over 58,000 tons
comes from North Carolina alone.' Hazardous waste includes waste
that is more environmentally dangerous than typical municipal waste,
and hazardous waste is defined by its serious threat to human health.
There are few landfills in the country that accept hazardous waste,
and it is extremely difficult to build a new hazardous waste facility
because people have adopted a "Not In My Back Yard" attitude.7
This limitation on the availability of hazardous waste disposal
capacity has led to "hazardous waste wars" between states that have
4. See S. REP. No. 102-301, at 4 (1992); OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION AGENCY, NATIONAL BIENNIAL RCRA
HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT ES-3 (1997) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT]
(based on 1995 data); Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous
and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68
TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1994). Total hazardous waste generation decreased from 258
million tons in 1993 to 214 million tons in 1995. See HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra,
at ES-3. Approximately 96% of the hazardous waste regulated by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") is treated on-site by the generator.
See Gerrard, supra, at 1056. Only about 2% of RCRA-regulated hazardous waste is ever
transported for disposal. See Bridgers, supra note 3, at 822. In 1995, over 10 million tons
of waste was shipped, and 25 million tons was disposed by burial in landfills or by
underground injection. See HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra, at ES-5, ES-7.
Although the percentage is small, there are so few hazardous waste disposal facilities and
such stiff federal regulations governing hazardous waste disposal that hazardous waste
wars have become almost inevitable. See Bridgers, supra note 3, at 822-23; see also
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 337 (1992) (discussing the fact
that there are only 21 hazardous waste landfills in operation in the United States).
5. See THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLAN tbl. 111-2
(1989), Record at Joint Appendix 254,263, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South
Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2317) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA
CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLAN].
6. RCRA defines "hazardous waste" as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1994).
7. See William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not in My Back Yard" Syndrome: An
Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB
Disposal Facilities, 63 N.C. L. REV. 811, 813 (1985); Gerrard, supra note 4, at 1052. The
phenomenon of "Not In My Back Yard" or "NIMBY" causes local officials to face huge
obstacles in planning and siting facilities that are necessary for the community. See
DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES:
LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 96-97 (1982).
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hazardous waste disposal facilities and those that do not.8 At the
heart of the matter, states that have built hazardous waste disposal
facilities are concerned when their facilities begin to fll up with waste
from other states, leaving less long-term capacity for their own
waste.9 States without facilities are seeking to keep that access open
and to ensure that they will have a place to send their waste."0
This conflict between states over hazardous waste disposal
capacity has been exacerbated by congressional action attempting to
enforce strict controls on these hazardous waste facilities and ensure
availability of hazardous waste disposal. The generation,
transportation, and disposal of hazardous waste are governed and
regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA").12 RCRA requires that states either implement the
federal program for managing hazardous waste or adopt a state
program to handle the waste.13. The state program must be
"consistent with" the federal program and must provide for adequate
enforcement. 4  Congress also enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA")' to deal with waste clean-up, and in 1986 Congress
adopted amendments to CERCLA, known as the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA").16 Under SARA,
states must submit additional plans to the Environmental Protection
Agency (the "EPA") to show that they will be able to deal with their
hazardous waste for the next twenty years.17 States may meet this
. See Bridgers, supra note 3, at 823.
9. See id. These states are understandably reluctant to spend the money and take
the political backlash involved with building a facility, only to have it filled by other states
unwilling to take the necessary steps to manage their own waste. See id.; see also County
Torn over Hazardous Waste Facility as North Carolina Searches State for Location, 21
ENV'T REP. 1839, 1840 (1991) (discussing the political backlash in North Carolina over
the proposed construction of a hazardous waste facility).
10. See Bridgers, supra note 3, at 821.
11. See id. at 823, 829-38.
12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), Pub. L. No. 94-
580, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1994)).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
14. See id.
15. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 2767 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
16. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)
(amending CERCLA)).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9).
652 [Vol. 76
DORMANT COMMERCE CLA USE
requirement by either demonstrating that they have adequate
capacity within their boundaries to dispose of their own hazardous
waste for twenty years, or by arranging for the disposal of their
hazardous waste in other states under an interregional agreement
that provides sufficient disposal capacity for twenty years."8
Congress had hoped that these provisions would force states to
take action to build hazardous waste facilities and find long-term
solutions to the hazardous waste crisis.19 Instead, the provisions
caused an escalation in the hazardous waste wars.? States with
disposal facilities enacted laws to limit out-of-state waste in order to
assure that their facilities would have sufficient capacity to hold in-
state waste for twenty years as required by SARA.2' Some states
entered into interregional agreements and sought to limit disposal in
their facilities by any states that were not part of the agreement.
These disposal limits were designed to ensure adequate disposal
capacity for states that were in the agreement, as required by
SARA.' Meanwhile, states without disposal facilities sought to force
other states to keep access open in order to ensure a site for disposal
of their waste.' Waste haulers and facility owners also resisted
18. See id. These proposals are known as Capacity Assurance Plans ("CAPs"). See
Bridgers, supra note 3, at 838. If a state fails to submit a CAP, it will be ineligible to
receive Superfund money to pay for hazardous waste cleanup within the state. See 42
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9).
19. See S. REP. No. 99-11, at 22-23 (1985); Bridgers, supra note 3, at 823,837-38.
20. See Bridgers, supra note 3, at 823, 838.
21. See, e.g., Act of June 20,1989, No. 196, 1989 S.C. Acts 1575, 1581 (codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-56-205 (Law Co-op. 1996)) (giving preference to in-state waste
generators); S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-17 (1989), Record at Joint Appendix 40-45,
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (No.
91-2317) [hereinafter S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-17] (same).
22. See SARA CAPACITY ASSURANCE REGIONAL AGREEMENT FOR REGION IV
STATES (1989), Record at Joint Appendix 249, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2317) [hereinafter SARA CAPACITY
ASSURANCE REGIONAL AGREEMENT]; Campbell Letter, supra note 1. North Carolina
entered into a regional hazardous waste agreement with Alabama, Kentucky, South
Carolina, and Tennessee. See SARA CAPACITY ASSURANCE REGIONAL AGREEMENT,
supra; Supplemental Memorandum of Defendants State of South Carolina, et al., in
Response to Plaintiff's Letter of December 10, 1990, C.A. No. 3:90-1402-0, Record at
Joint Appendix 667, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781
(4th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2317) [hereinafter Supplemental Memorandum]. Under the
agreement, North Carolina was required to begin issuing permits for construction of a
treatment facility by the end of 1990. See Supplemental Memorandum, supra, at 2,
Record at Joint Appendix 668. When North Carolina failed to meet this requirement,
waste wars erupted as South Carolina attempted to prohibit importation of any North
Carolina waste. See Judge Blocks S.C. Ban on N.C. Waste Disposal, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (S.C. Edition), Jan. 12,1991, at B1.
23. See Judge Blocks S.C. Ban on N.C. Waste Disposal, supra note 22, at B1.
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disposal limitations because it restricted their business.24
The courts became involved in these interstate waste wars in the
late 1970s and have applied the dormant Commerce Clause' to
prevent states from enacting laws that discriminate against out-of-
state waste." In Environmental Technology Council v. Sierra Club,2
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit further limited the power
of states to enact such statutes and ruled that congressional action
under RCRA and SARA did not preempt application of the dormant
Commerce Clause.28
This Note first discusses the facts of Environmental Technology
Council ("ETC") and the procedural history of the case as it traveled
through the federal courts over the past five years.29 The Note then
considers the holding and reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in ETC.30
After considering the historical line of cases addressing waste
management statutes and the dormant Commerce Clause,3 the Note
analyzes the standing and influence of ETC within this line of cases."
Finally, the Note considers the ramifications of ETC for states that
are attempting to devise waste management plans as required by
federal statutes but that are limited in their ability to do so by the
24. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781,
782 (4th Cir. 1991) (illustrating a challenge to South Carolina laws by an association of
commercial waste businesses); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama
Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 715 (11th Cir. 1990) (illustrating a challenge
by a waste industry group to Alabama laws limiting waste import), as modified upon
denial ofreh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
25. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. This provision is referred to as the Commerce Clause, and it has a "dormant" or
"negative" aspect that prevents states from burdening interstate commerce even if
Congress has not acted. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-29
(1978). Congress may act and give the states power to affect commerce, but in the
absence of congressional action, the dormant Commerce Clause limits states' ability to
affect interstate commerce. See id.; see also infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in City of Philadelphia and reviewing the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause analysis).
26. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (holding that a New Jersey statute
prohibiting importation of out-of-state waste was invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause); see also infra notes 85-162 (discussing the cases during the past twenty years
invalidating state statutes under the dormant Commerce Clause).
27. 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
28. See id. at 782-85.
29. See infra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 85-162 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 163-204 and accompanying text.
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dormant Commerce Clause.33
South Carolina is one of the few states with hazardous waste
treatment and disposal facilities. M As a result, it imports a large
amount of hazardous waste generated in other states.35 Under SARA
and as part of the state management plan required by RCRA, South
Carolina promulgated several laws governing the management of
hazardous waste.' These laws were designed to ensure long-term
disposal capacity for South Carolina's hazardous waste in the in-state
facilities by setting some limits on out-of-state waste and by requiring
that a certain amount of space be reserved each year for in-state
hazardous waste. 7 The laws also prohibited importation of waste
from states that did not have a long-term disposal plan or an
interregional agreement as required by SARA.8
33. See infra notes 205-35 and accompanying text.
34. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 778-79.
35. See id. at 779; see also SoUTH CAROLINA CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLAN, supra
note 5, at tbl.HI-2, Record at Joint Appendix 263 (showing that South Carolina imports
over 138,000 tons of hazardous waste per year).
36. See Act of June 13, 1990, No. 590 § 2, 1990 S.C. Acts 2494 (codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-56-60 (Law Co-op 1996)); Act of June 20, 1989, No. 196 § 9, 1989 S.C. Acts
1575, 1581 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-205); S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-25 (July 6,
1989), Record at Joint Appendix 57, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South
Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2317) [hereinafter S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-
25]; S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-17, supra note 21; Hazardous Waste Management Planning,
14 S.C. Reg. 20-22 (1990) (adopting South Carolina DHEC Regulation 61-99), available
in Record at Joint Appendix 37, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina,
945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2317) [hereinafter S.C. DHEC Reg. 61-99].
37. See Act of June 13, 1990, No. 590 § 2, 1990 S.C. Acts 2494; Act of June 20, 1989,
No. 196 § 9, 1989 S.C. Acts 1575, 1581; S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-25, supra note 36; S.C.
DHEC Reg. 61-99, supra note 36.
38. See Act of June 20, 1989, No. 196, 1989 S.C. Acts 1575, 1581; S.C. Exec. Order
No. 89-17, supra note 21. The South Carolina provisions included several different
components that discriminated against out-of-state waste. First, South Carolina had a
"blacklisting" provision that prohibited South Carolina facilities from accepting waste
generated in a state that prohibited in-state treatment of waste or was not part of an
interregional treatment agreement required under SARA. See Act of June 20, 1989, No.
196 § 9, 1989 S.C. Acts 1575,1581. Second, South Carolina imposed a limit on all waste to
be buried in the state. See Act of June 13, 1990, No. 590 § 2, 1990 S.C. Acts 2494. This
limiting provision provided that no more than a certain number of tons of waste could be
buried in South Carolina facilities each year, but provided that the limit could be lifted if
necessary to protect the health and citizens of South Carolina and only if the waste was
generated in South Carolina. See id. The same act provides for discriminatory "floors"
and "ceilings." See idL A "floor" on in-state waste provided that facilities must reserve at
least the same capacity as the previous year for South Carolina waste. See id. A "ceiling"
on out-of-state waste provided that facilities must accept no more waste from any given
state than was accepted the previous year. See id South Carolina also instituted quota
preferences for in-state waste and limited the amount of waste that could be imported
from any single state. See S.C. Exec. Order No. 89-25, supra note 36. Finally, South
Carolina imposed a "needs" requirement for obtaining permission to expand any
1998]
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South Carolina enacted these laws in an effort to demonstrate
long-term capacity for in-state waste under SARA.39 However, the
owners of the commercial hazardous waste facilities wanted to be
able to continue accepting greater amounts of desired waste from any
source. The owners resisted the restrictions that South Carolina
placed on the facilities' growth and on their ability to accept out-of-
state waste.40 These facility owners are part of a consortium known as
the Environmental Technology Council ("ETC"),41 and the Council
sued under the dormant Commerce Clause to enjoin South Carolina
from enforcing these laws.42
hazardous waste facility. See S.C. DHEC Reg. 61-99, supra note 36. South Carolina
hazardous waste facilities were prohibited from expanding unless they could demonstrate
the "need" to expand. See id. However, this "need" could be based only on reference to
South Carolina waste and to needed disposal capacity for in-state waste. See id.; see also
ETC, 98 F.3d at 780-81 (explaining this requirement).
39. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 780-81. SARA requires states to assure adequate long-term
hazardous waste disposal capacity for in-state waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1994).
SARA provides:
Effective 3 years after October 17, 1986, the President shall not provide any
remedial actions pursuant to this section unless the State in which the release
occurs first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with the President
providing assurances deemed adequate by the President that the State will
assure the availability of hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities
which-.
(A) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure disposition
of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be generated within the
State during the 20-year period following the date of such contract or
cooperative agreement and to be disposed of, treated, or destroyed,
(B) are within the State or outside the State in accordance with an interstate
agreement or regional agreement or authority,
(C) are acceptable to the President, and
(D) are in compliance with the requirements of Subtitle C of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act.
Id.
40. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 778.
41. See id The consortium was formerly known as the Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council. See Environmental Tech. Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 n.2
(D.S.C. 1995), affd sub nom. Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). "ETC is a non-profit association of
commercial firms that provide services for the treatment, recycling, and disposal of
hazardous wastes." ETC, 98 F.3d at 778 n.1. Three commercial hazardous waste facilities
in South Carolina were owned and operated by members of ETC, and ETC sued to
challenge the South Carolina laws restricting disposal at its facilities. See id. at 778.
42. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 782. ETC also challenged the laws under the Supremacy
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, as
well as under § 1983. See id. at 778; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2 (Supremacy
Clause); id, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (Privileges and Immunities Clause); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)
(allowing for civil actions by citizens deprived of their constitutional rights). However,
the district court addressed only the Commerce Clause issue. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 778 n.2.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it was unnecessary to reach the
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The ETC challenge to South Carolina's discriminatory laws
wound through the federal court system for over five years.43  The
dispute began in 1990 when South Carolina eliminated North
Carolina from a regional agreement" designed to ensure long-term
disposal capacity for member states.45 As part of the agreement,
North Carolina was required to begin the permit process by the end
of 1990 for construction of an incinerator.' However, in December
1990, North Carolina's Council of State rejected the transfer of
certain state-owned lands as a site for the incinerator. 7 Because
North Carolina failed to meet its obligations under the regional
agreement, South Carolina eliminated North Carolina from the
compact.4" Under South Carolina law, South Carolina facilities would
be prohibited from accepting waste from North Carolina because
North Carolina was no longer part of a regional agreement under
SARA.49
In January 1991, the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina issued a preliminary injunction to keep South
Carolina from enforcing the challenged laws until the case was
decided: South Carolina appealed the decision to the Fourth
Circuit, and the court affirmed the district court's preliminary
injunction." The Fourth Circuit agreed that the Commerce Clause
validity of the laws under these additional provisions because the laws were invalid under
the Commerce Clause. See id.
43. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431
(D.S.C.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991), on remand, 901
F. Supp. 1026 (D.S.C. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club,
98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
44. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 786; Campbell Letter, supra note 1.
45. See SARA CAPACITY ASSURANCE REGIONAL AGREEMENT, supra note 22;
Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 22, at 1-2, Record at Joint Appendix 668.
46. See Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 22, at 2, Record at Joint Appendix
668.
47. See Campbell Letter, supra note 1; Judge Blocks S.C. Ban on N. C. Waste
Disposal, supra note 22, at B1.
48. See Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 22, at 2, Record at Joint Appendix
668; Campbell Letter, supra note 1.
49. See Campbell Letter, supra note 1; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text (describing the South Carolina laws and the blacklisting provision); supra note 39
(describing the requirements of SARA).
50. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431,442
(D.S.C.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991), on remand, 901
F. Supp. 1026 (D.S.C. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club,
98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
51. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 795
(4th Cir. 1991), on remand, 901 F. Supp. 1026 (D.S.C. 1995), affd sub nom.
Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
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challenge presented a "grave and serious question" that justified the
granting of a preliminary injunction." Although the court noted that
only "broad outlines" were necessary at the preliminary injunction
stage, it still embarked on an extensive consideration of both the
federal statutes at issue and the South Carolina statutes being
challenged.53 However, the court chose to limit its ruling to the issue
of a preliminary injunction and declined to decide the case on the
merits.' The court analyzed South Carolina's requirements under
the dormant Commerce Clause and held that RCRA and CERCLA
did not show any clear intention to authorize such discriminatory
state actions." The court found that irreparable harm would be
highly likely if a preliminary injunction was not granted. 6 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the
district court, remanding the case for minor modifications of the
order.'
On remand from the Fourth Circuit, ETC moved for summary
judgment before the district court in South Carolina. The district
52. See id. at 782.
53. See 1d. at 782-86.
54. See id. at 789. The Hazardous Waste Treatment Council urged the court to
decide the case on the merits, but the court chose not to do so, finding that "facts
remain[ed] in dispute." Id. at 789 n.1. The court also noted that "the complexities
inherent in the hazardous waste situation would make perilous any attempt to decide the
case on the merits at the early preliminary injunction stage." Id.
55. See id. at 789-95.
56. See id. at 795. The court noted the policy concerns in this area:
Perhaps most importantly, the effect of every state designing particular limits
and bars for out-of-state waste could be catastrophic. Indeed, such treatment of
hazardous waste-in essence, ensured nontreatment of some hazardous waste-
might destroy not only the theoretical principle of a national economic union,
but contains the real potential to destroy land, if not also persons, within the
union. Unless and until Congress alters the law, the apparent congressional
intent of RCRA and SARA would seem to remain-better that hazardous waste
be treated and disposed of somewhere, even if spread disproportionately among
the states, than that future Superfund sites arise.
Id. at 792.
57. See id at 795. The court remanded the case in part for modification by the
district court. Part of the decision by the district court implied that the statutes were held
invalid and that all of the waste management statutes were included in the holding. See
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431, 441-42
(D.S.C.), affd in part and remanded in part, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction but remanded those portions to the
district court to modify the order so that only the challenged statutes and orders were
included and so that it was clear the laws were being preliminarily enjoined but not yet
declared invalid. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d at
795.
58. See Environmental Tech. Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1028
658 [Vol. 76
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court granted summary judgment for ETC, finding that the laws
discriminated on their face and were subject to strict scrutiny under
the Commerce Clause.59 The district court refused to refer the case to
the EPA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,' holding that
primary jurisdiction involved the referral of factual rather than legal
issues.6 Because there were no real factual disputes and because the
constitutional issues were more properly before the court rather than
the EPA, the district court refused to defer to the EPA and ruled on
the legal issues itself.' The court considered the history of waste
management cases and discriminatory laws under the Commerce
Clause and concluded that the challenged laws should be
permanently enjoined as invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause.'
South Carolina, frustrated with this permanent injunction
against enforcing its waste limitations, appealed the grant of
summary judgment to the Fourth Circuit in the primary case,
Environmental Technology Council v. Sierra Club ("ETC").Y South
Carolina argued that the dormant Commerce Clause should not
apply since Congress gave states the authority to act in this manner
through RCRA and SARA.' The dormant Commerce Clause limits
states' ability to affect interstate commerce only if Congress has not
(D.S.C. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). The court did not make any
modification to the preliminary injunction because the grant of summary judgment meant
that "any modification of the preliminary injunction is now moot." Id. at 1029. The court
granted a permanent injunction and denied any motion to modify the preliminary
injunction. See id.
59. See id. at 1029-30.
60. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is based on the idea that leaving questions of
fact for the appropriate agency to decide will aid in uniformity and will make use of the
agency's specialized knowledge and expertise. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956); see also infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text
(discussing the primary jurisdiction holding in ETC).
61. See Environmental Tech. Council, 901 F. Supp. at 1029.
62. See id.
63. See id, at 1035-38; see also infra notes 85-162 and accompanying text (describing
the development of waste management cases and the dormant Commerce Clause analysis
in this context).
64. 98 F.3d 774,778 (4th Cir. 1996), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). Even though
South Carolina was the primary party and appellant, the Sierra Club was listed as the
appellant, see id., because it was able to intervene in the case. See In re Sierra Club, 945
F.2d 776, 780-81 (4th Cir. 1991) (remanding the case to the district court with directions
to reconsider the Sierra Club's right to intervene and noting that the Sierra Club would
offer a different perspective).
65. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 781-82.
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acted." South Carolina argued that Congress had acted and had
given states the ability to enact ordinances necessary to meet the
long-term disposal capacity assurance plan required by SARA.67
South Carolina also argued that the EPA had approved the South
Carolina plan as "consistent" with federal law and that the EPA had
primary jurisdiction in determining whether South Carolina's laws
were constitutional.' South Carolina urged the court to defer to the
decision of the EPA. 9
66. See id at 782. The court noted that "[w]here Congress has acted in an area
specifically authorizing state or local government action, the dormant Commerce Clause
is ... inapplicable, even if the state action interferes with interstate commerce." Id.; see
also Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are
invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause."); South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984) (noting that Congress may
authorize state regulation that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause,
but "congressional intent must be unmistakably clear"); White v. Massachusetts Council
of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983) ("Where state or local government
action is specifically authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause
even if it interferes with interstate commerce.").
67. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 779, 782-83; see also supra note 39 (discussing the
requirements under SARA). South Carolina analogized its position to that of the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). See ETC, 98 F.3d
at 782-83. In Merrion, the Tribe imposed a severance tax on all oil and gas removed from
tribal lands. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133. The tax was challenged as a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 152-53. However, the Court found that the
dormant Commerce Clause did not apply because "Congress has affirmatively acted by
providing a series of federal checkpoints that must be cleared before a tribal tax can take
effect." Id. at 155. The Tribe was required to get administrative approval at two stages
before the tax could take effect. See id. South Carolina argued that this approval process
was analogous to the approval process under SARA and RCRA, which require EPA
approval of state waste management plans at several checkpoints. See ETC, 98 F.3d at
782-83. However, the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument. See id. at 783; see also infra
note 68 (describing the EPA's approval of this plan and the Court's reasoning for
rejecting that argument).
68. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 781-83. As required under RCRA, South Carolina submitted
its hazardous waste management plan to the EPA. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 11, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-2317) [hereinafter Brief for the
United States]. The EPA approved the RCRA plan in 1985 and approved South
Carolina's Capacity Assurance Plan in 1990. See id. at 11-12. RCRA required that the
plan be "consistent" with federal law and other state laws. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 779 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1994)); see also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (describing
the requirements of RCRA). However, the court disagreed "with South Carolina's
contention that EPA has specifically addressed and authorized some of the challenged
provisions." ETC, 98 F.3d at 781 n.11. In particular, the court may have been influenced
by the fact that the plan was approved in 1985, long before the restrictive provisions were
enacted in South Carolina. See id.; Brief for the United States, supra, at 11. For
additional discussion of the EPA's position and involvement in this case, see infra notes
192-204 and accompanying text.
69. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 782.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected South Carolina's arguments and
permanently enjoined the state from enforcing any of the challenged
laws." The court's decision included three major holdings. First, the
court held that RCRA, CERCLA, and SARA do not override the
dormant Commerce Clause.71 The court determined that the
dormant Commerce Clause applies unless congressional intent is
"unmistakably clear" or "expressly stated" to allow the
discriminating law.' The court held that RCRA, CERCLA, and
SARA do not contain any such clear statement of intent to allow
states to enact laws that discriminate against other states or burden
interstate commerce.?
Second, the court applied the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis that has been used in many recent waste management cases.74
For laws that discriminate on their face or in their effect, the court
applies a "virtual per se" rule of invalidity.75 Under this per se rule,
the South Carolina statutes were held to violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. 6 Finally, the court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to defer to the EPA under the
70. See id, at 778.
71. See id. at 782-85.
72. See id. at 782 (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
91 (1984)). The court noted that "Congress need not state that it intends to override the
dormant Commerce Clause, but it must affirmatively have contemplated the otherwise
invalid state legislation." Id.
73. See icL at 783-85. The court noted that this conclusion was similar to that reached
by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 910 F.2d 713,721 (11th Cir.
1990), as modified upon denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991), and in Alabama v.
EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989). See ETC, 98 F.3d at 785. For a discussion
of the court's holding in National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n and the conclusion
reached in both of these cases, see infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
74. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 785-89. For a discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause
analyses in recent waste management cases, see infra notes 85-162 and accompanying
text.
75. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 785-86. This per se rule of invalidity applies "where a state
law discriminates facially, in its practical effect, or in its purpose." Id. at 785. Very few
state statutes have been able to survive this per se rule of invalidity. To survive, the state
must show the legislation is justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism and that there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives sufficient to protect
the local interest. See id. The only state statutes that have been able to survive were
related to threat of disease or death. See id. For example, Maine statutes were upheld
limiting baitfish that could be brought into the state because outside diseases had the
potential to destroy Maine's fisheries. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986).
However, no statutes limiting the importation or movement of waste have been upheld
under this per se rule. See infra notes 85-162 and accompanying text (discussing the waste
management cases and the dormant Commerce Clause).
76. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 786-89.
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doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' The court determined that the
statutes in question involved legal issues rather than factual issues;
while it is appropriate to defer to the expertise of the EPA on factual
issues, the EPA was in no better position than the court to interpret
the constitutionality of the statutes at issue.78 Based on these three
major conclusions, the court held that the South Carolina statutes
violated the dormant Commerce Clause and should be permanently
enjoined." The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, and
the permanent injunction remains in force."
The South Carolina hazardous waste management statutes at
issue in ETC were enacted as part of the state's waste management
plan.8' State waste management initiatives became an important
focus of state and local environmental concerns during the 1970s, and
litigation over waste management statutes has increased in the past
two decades. Many states were beginning to see landfills reach total
capacity, and new landfills were hard to site and build due to
increasing federal regulation and increasing public concern regarding
environmental effects." In order to protect the remaining capacity in
its own landfills, New Jersey passed a state ordinance prohibiting the
importation of "solid or liquid waste which originated or was
collected outside the territorial limits of the State."' In the first
"waste management" case challenged on Commerce Clause grounds,
the City of Philadelphia and the operators of private landfills in New
Jersey sued to enjoin New Jersey from enforcing this prohibition.'
The Supreme Court held that the New Jersey prohibition was invalid
under the dormant Commerce Clause," creating the basis for
subsequent challenges to waste management statutes during the next
twenty years.'7
77. See id. at 789. For a brief discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, see
supra note 60.
78. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 789. For additional discussion of this procedural argument
and holding, see infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
79. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 778.
80. See South Carolina v. Environmental Tech. Council, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997)
(denying petition for certiorari).
81. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
82. Cf. Bridgers, supra note 3, at 839-59 (chronicling the development of the
hazardous waste wars in the courts).
83. See i at 822-23, 827-28.
84. Waste Control Act Amendments of 1973, ch. 363, 1973 N.J. Laws 962 (codified
at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13.11-10 (West 1979) (repealed 1981)).
85. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 619 (1978).
86. See id. at 629.
87. See infra notes 99-162 and accompanying text. See generally Stephen M. Johnson,
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City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey included several major
holdings regarding waste management legislation and the dormant
Commerce Clause. First, the Court considered whether RCRA,
which was recently enacted at that time, preempted any state
legislation in this area.' The Court held that the state legislation was
not preempted by RCRA and was valid absent a constitutional
violation."' The Court further held that waste was an article of
commerce and therefore was properly subject to the constraints of
the Commerce Clause."° In a holding significant to all later waste
management cases, the Court noted that "[a]ll objects of interstate
trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by
definition at the outset.... Just as Congress has power to regulate
the interstate movement of these wastes, States are not free from
constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement."'"
After determining that waste is an article of commerce, the
Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L. REv. 131 (1990) (analyzing the
Court's holding in City of Philadelphia and arguing that Pennsylvania's solid waste
management laws should survive court scrutiny); Susan Adams Brietzke, Note,
Hazardous Waste in Interstate Commerce: Minimizing the Problem After City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 77, 91-94, 105-10 (1989) (examining the
holding in City of Philadelphia and arguing that legislation should be adopted to allow
states to manage their waste, using the Capacity Assurance Plan as a starting point).
88. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 620.
89. See id. at 620-21. The Court did not explicitly consider whether RCRA
authorized state action so that the dormant Commerce Clause would not apply.
However, after determining that the state legislation was not preempted by RCRA, the
Court went on to consider the constitutionality of the state legislation under the dormant
Commerce Clause, implicitly assuming that the state legislation was not authorized by
RCRA generally and was still subject to Commerce Clause constraints. See id.
90. See id. at 621-23.
91. Id. at 622-23. The Court distinguished waste from articles that older cases had
excluded from Commerce Clause restrictions because they were not" 'legitimate subjects
of trade and commerce.'" Id. at 622 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.,
125 U.S. 465,489 (1888)). These older cases excluded articles
"which, on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease,
pestilence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected with the germs of
yellow fever or the virus of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that
are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for
human use or consumption."
Id. (quoting Bowman, 125 U.S. at 489). The Court distinguished these cases by noting
that the test was whether the "articles' worth in intersfate commerce was far outweighed
by the dangers inhering in their very movement." Id.
In his dissenting opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist focused on these earlier cases and
argued that regulations designed to handle disposal of waste were the same as regulations
involving diseased meat and other noxious items. See id, at 629-33 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that New Jersey should be able to treat its own
waste without Commerce Clause limitations under the Court's cases allowing these types
of laws in quarantine situations and other similar cases. See id. at 632-33 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Court considered the level of review for determining the validity of
the statute under the Commerce Clause? The Court recognized that
if legislation patently discriminates against interstate trade and
effects economic protectionism, a "virtual per se rule of invalidity"
applies. If, instead, legislation does not patently discriminate
against interstate trade and advances other legislative objectives, a
more flexible balancing test should be applied.94 The Court
concluded that it was irrelevant whether the purpose of New Jersey's
statute was to reduce waste costs for residents or to limit pollution in
the state.' Regardless of the purpose, "it may not be accomplished
by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside
the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently."96 The Court therefore concluded that New Jersey's
prohibition discriminated against interstate commerce on its face
because it treated waste differently based solely on its origin.'
Applying the "virtual per se rule of invalidity," the Court struck
down the New Jersey prohibition under the Commerce Clause and
refused to let New Jersey "close its borders."98
92. See id. at 623-28.
93. See id. at 624; see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538
(1949) ("[S]tates are not separable economic units.... [W]hat is ultimate is the principle
that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic
isolation." (internal quotation omitted)).
94. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. This balancing test, known as the Pike
test, is applied if the statute regulates evenhandedly and "its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). If
the legislation effectuates a legitimate local public interest, the statute will be upheld
unless "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." Id.
95. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626.
96. Id. at 626-27.
97. See id. at 628-29. The Court noted that the waste was not any different or any
more harmful if it came from out of state, so that there was no basis for distinguishing the
waste aside from its origin. See id.
98. See id. at 629. With ironic foresight, the Court noted:
Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or necessary to send their
waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those States might then
claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will protect New
Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one
State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem
shared by all.
ld. Twenty years later, as predicted, New Jersey is one of the largest exporters of waste.
See Holusha, supra note 3, § 4, at 5 (reprinting a chart from the National Solid Waste
Management Association); see also Peter Passell, The Garbage Problem: It May Be
Politics, Not Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at Cl (describing New Jersey's waste
export problem). New Jersey no longer imports any other state's garbage and instead
exports garbage to Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
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Over the next ten years, the Supreme Court failed to address any
additional waste management cases. However, in 1986 Congress
enacted SARA and fueled a new wave of state waste management
legislationY Disputes began to arise over this legislation, particularly
over Alabama's waste management statutes. 0° The country's largest
commercial hazardous waste facility is located in Emelle, Alabama,
and, in 1989, Alabama sought to impose limits on out-of-state wastes
that could be imported to its facility."' The owner and operator of
the Emelle facility challenged the Alabama "blacklisting" legislation,
which prohibited the importation of waste from certain states that did
not meet Alabama's statutory requirements." The owner of the
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Holusha, supra note 3, § 4, at 5.
99. See Jonathan Phillip Myers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased
Federal Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO.
L.J. 567, 575 (1991). SARA requires states to assure long-term capacity for disposal of
state hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1994); see also supra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text (discussing SARA's requirements); supra note 39 (quoting the
relevant portions of SARA). In an effort to make these assurances, states enacted laws to
attempt to reserve in-state landfill capacity for in-state waste by excluding or limiting out-
of-state waste.
100. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713, 715 (11th Cir. 1990), as modified upon denial of reh'g, 924
F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991). Several student commentators have criticized the decision in
this case. See Scott F. Cooper, Note, Constitutional and Environmental Law-
Misinterpretation of Congressional Intent and Applicable Standards for Commerce Clause
Review of CERCLA-National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of
Environmental Management, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 1141, 1149-59 (1991) (criticizing the
Court's decision in National Solid Wastes Management based on the implied authority
granted by CERCLA for states to enter into regional waste agreements, and arguing that
invalidating these laws under the dormant Commerce Clause frustrated Congress's
purpose to help the states to enact long-term waste management plans); Louvin H.
Skinner, Note, National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management: Environmental Protection and the Commerce Clause-Is Environmental
Protection a Legitimate Local Concern, 37 LOY. L. REV. 189, 199-203 (1991) (discussing
and analyzing the Court's opinion). But see Michael J. Tomko, Note, National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management: A Failed Attempt to
Escape City of Philadelphia, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 285, 300-07
(1992) (analyzing the opinion in the context of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, and arguing that the decision was correct because Congress did not authorize
states to ban out-of-state waste). See generally Robert 0. Jenkins, Note, Constitutionally
Mandated Southern Hospitality: National Solid Wastes Management Association and
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Environmental
Management, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1001 (1991) (discussing the Court's opinion in the context
of the dormant Commerce Clause and arguing that Alabama should be able to put some
limits on hazardous waste import in order to protect the health and safety of its citizens
and to effectuate the congressional purpose behind SARA).
101. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 715,717.
102. See id. at 716-17. The Alabama statute prohibited Alabama commercial waste
facilities from accepting waste from any state that prohibited treatment of hazardous
waste within its borders or did not have a state treatment facility or a regional agreement
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facility and the trade association argued that this "blacklisting"
provision was invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, and the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed.1'
In National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama
Department of Environmental Management,"4 the Eleventh Circuit
first held that hazardous waste is an article of commerce subject to
the limitations of the Commerce Clause." Following Supreme Court
precedent, the court applied the virtual per se rule of invalidity for
state legislation that overtly blocked the flow of interstate commerce
at the state's borders."0 Finding that Alabama's legislation blocked
the flow of interstate commerce, the court noted that there were
alternative means for meeting the state's goals of environmental
protection." The legislation was therefore invalid under the virtual
per se rule."8
Alabama argued that the dormant Commerce Clause should not
apply since Congress had authorized states to enact this type of
legislation as part of the capacity assurance plan required by
for the disposal of hazardous waste. See Act of May 11, 1989, No. 89-788, 1989 Ala. Acts
1572 (the "Holley Bill") (codified at ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 (1989)). This provision is
identical to the "blacklisting" provision at issue in ETC, except that the Alabama statute
required that Alabama approve the regional agreement before the agreement could
qualify for the statutory exception. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at
717; see also ETC, 98 F.3d at 780-81 (describing South Carolina's similar blacklisting
provision). The owner of the facility also challenged Alabama regulations that required
Alabama preapproval before other states could send waste to Alabama and that required
more stringent pretreatment of out-of-state hazardous waste than similar EPA
regulations. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 715.
103. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 718.
104. 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), as modified upon denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001
(11th Cir. 1991).
105. See id at 718. The court based its conclusion on the Supreme Court's holding in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978). The court noted that
"[a]lthough the hazardous waste involved in this case may be innately more dangerous
than the solid and liquid waste involved in City of Philadelphia, we cannot say that the
dangers of hazardous waste outweigh its worth in interstate commerce." National Solid
Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 719.
106. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 719-20. The test consists of
two parts. The first part examines whether the statute discriminates on its face. See id. If
it does, then the second part requires that there be a legitimate local purpose that could
not be met by any less discriminatory means. See iL This virtual per se rule of invalidity
is a strict scrutiny test for any state statute that discriminates on its face. See id. The
court found that Alabama could meet its goals of health and safety by less discriminatory
means and thus held the statutes invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. See id.
107. See id at 720. The court noted that Alabama could fulfill its capacity assurance
plan under SARA by contracting with the Emelle facility for long-term capacity for
Alabama waste rather than blocking the facility from accepting other waste by state
statute. See id
108. See id at 719 (citing City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S at 624).
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SARA." The court considered this argument but concluded that
"nothing in SARA evidences congressional authorization for each
state to close its borders to wastes generated in other states to force
those other states to meet federally mandated hazardous waste
management requirements." '
With landfill capacity decreasing rapidly and SARA requiring
long-term capacity assurances, Alabama modified its statutes, and
other states enacted similar legislation to test ways to limit the
importation of hazardous waste."' As these statutes proliferated and
were challenged in the courts, splits in decisions began to develop.
Just one year after denying certiorari in National Solid Wastes
Management, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases in which
courts upheld state waste management legislation following a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge." The first case involved
Alabama statutes that were modified after the "blacklisting"
provisions were struck down by the Eleventh Circuit.114  The new
Alabama legislation provided for an additional fee on out-of-state
waste disposed in commercial facilities in Alabama.' 5 In Chemical
109. See id. at 721; see also supra note 39 (quoting the relevant portions of SARA).
110. National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 721. The court noted that
congressional intent to authorize states to affect interstate commerce must be "expressly
stated" and "unmistakably clear." Id. The court also cited an earlier Eleventh Circuit
case in which the court noted that "'[a]lthough Congress may override the commerce
clause by express statutory language, it has not done so in enacting CERCLA.'" Id.
(quoting Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989)). The Supreme Court
denied certiorari and let this ruling stand. See Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management v.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991) (denying petition for
certiorari).
111. See Bridgers, supra note 3, at 839-59.
112 Two courts held that discriminatory waste management legislation did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause, in direct opposition to the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
National Solid Wastes Management. Compare Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (finding
that amendments to the Solid Waste Management Act requiring county approval for
disposal of out-of-state waste did not violate the Commerce Clause), affd, 931 F.2d 413
(6th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992), and Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,
584 So. 2d 1367, 1376, 1390 (Ala. 1991) (holding that a statute imposing a base fee and an
additional fee for out-of-state waste did not violate the Commerce Clause), rev'd, 504
U.S. 334 (1992), with National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 718 (holding that
discriminatory state legislation violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
113. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. 353; Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. 334.
114. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 719; see also supra notes 100-
10 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's holding that struck down
these blacklisting provisions).
115. See Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 338. The Alabama provisions also
limited the amount of waste that could be disposed in any one-year period and provided
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Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,11 the Supreme Court found that this
fee provision was subject to the limits of the dormant Commerce
Clause."'
The Supreme Court applied the rule from City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey and held that "[n]o State may attempt to isolate itself
from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to
the free flow of interstate trade..1 . The Court concluded that the fee
on out-of-state waste discriminated against an article of commerce
based solely on its origin and was subject to the virtual per se rule of
invalidity."9 The Court considered the legitimate local purposes
presented by Alabama but found that there were less discriminatory
alternatives to achieve the goals of decreasing the volume and
transport of waste in Alabama." As in its holding in City of
Philadelphia, the Court in Chemical Waste Management refused to
recognize the fee as analogous to quarantine laws or to laws that
allowed states to prohibit the import of noxious articles.21 The Court
therefore determined that under the virtual per se rule, the Alabama
that the amount of hazardous waste disposed during the first year with the new fees
became the permanent ceiling for disposal in later years. See id. The statutes provided
for a base fee of $25.60 per ton with an additional fee for out-of-state waste of $72.00 per
ton. See Act of April 17, 1990, No. 90-326, 1990 Ala. Acts 448 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of ALA. CODE §§ 22-30B-1 to -18 (1990)).
116. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
117. See id. at 340. The Court noted that "[tIhe Commerce Clause thus imposes some
constraints on [Alabama's] ability to regulate these transactions," and it cited National
Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management,
910 F.2d 713, 718-19 (11th Cir. 1990), as modified on denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th
Cir. 1991). Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 340 n.3.
118. Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 339-40.
119. See id. at 341-42.
120. See id. at 343-45. The Court noted that Alabama could impose the additional fee
on all waste including in-state waste, or could charge a per-mile tax on all vehicles
transporting waste in Alabama regardless of origin. See id.
121. See id. at 34647. The Court distinguished the quarantine laws by noting that
"Alabama permits both the generation and landfilling of hazardous waste within its
borders and the importation of still more hazardous waste subject to payment of the
additional fee," whereas the quarantine laws "did not discriminate against interstate
commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin."
Id. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that states should be able to
limit the import of waste as a "noxious article" under the quarantine laws. See id. at 349-
51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). With clear foresight, Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted:
Assuming that those States that are currently the targets for large volumes of
hazardous waste do not simply ban hazardous waste sites altogether, they will
undoubtedly continue to search for a way to limit their risk from sites in
operation. And each new arrangement will generate a new legal challenge, one
that will work to the principal advantage only of those States that refuse to
contribute to a solution.
Id. at 351-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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fee provisions violated the dormant Commerce Clause."
On the same day that the Chemical Waste Management case was
decided, the Supreme Court also ruled that states could not skirt the
limits of the Commerce Clause by making the import bans effective
at the county level rather than at the state level." In Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,24 the
Court considered Michigan regulations that provided that waste
generated outside a county could not be accepted for disposal within
the county unless the county plan explicitly authorized the disposal.
'1
The owner of a waste facility in St. Clair County sought permission
from the County Planning Committee to dispose of out-of-state waste
in his facility." His request was denied, effectively preventing the
facility from accepting any waste that did not originate in St. Clair
County." The Supreme Court applied the rule from City of
Philadelphia and noted that subdivisions of a state cannot do what a
state is prohibited from doing under the Constitution." The Court
reiterated its position that waste is an article of commerce29 and held
122. See id. at 347-49. The Court did not address the issue of congressional
authorization allowing state statutes to affect interstate commerce and making the
dormant Commerce Clause inapplicable. The Court noted that "[v]arious amici assert
that the discrimination patent in the Act's additional fee is consistent with congressional
authorization. We pretermit this issue, for it was not the basis for the decision below and
has not been briefed or argued by the parties here." Id. at 346 n.9. For a general
discussion of the Court's decision in Chemical Waste Management, see Edward A.
Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources and Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
78, 83-102, 118-21 (1994) (discussing the Court's decision and its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, and arguing that the decision undermined the ability of states to protect
the health and safety of their citizens), and Kenneth G. Cole, Comment, Hunt v.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc.: Alabama Attempts to Spread the Nation's Hazardous
Waste Disposal Burden by Imposing a Higher Tax on Out-of-State Hazardous Waste, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1215, 1233-67 (1992) (analyzing the Court's decision and
proposing a uniform tax on waste generators as an alternative solution following the
invalidation of Alabama's laws).
123. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353, 361,363 (1992).
124. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
125. See id. at 355-57; see also Solid Waste Management Act Amendments of 1988,
No. 475, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 1902 (codified at MICH. COMe. LAWS §§ 299.413a,
299.430(2) (repealed and replaced by Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Act of 1994, No. 451, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 2215 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 324.11513,324.11538))).
126. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 357.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 361.
129. See id. at 359 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-23
(1978)).
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that the Michigan prohibitions clearly discriminated against interstate
commerce because they authorized each county to isolate itself from
the national problem of hazardous waste management.'
Michigan argued that the regulations did not discriminate
against interstate commerce on their face and were evenhanded
because they prohibited any importation of waste into the county,
regardless of whether the waste originated in Michigan 31 The Court
rejected this argument and found that the regulations were facially
discriminatory; states cannot avoid the limits of the Commerce
Clause by acting through their subdivisions." The Court held that
since the regulations were facially discriminatory, they were invalid
under the virtual per se rule unless Michigan could show that they
advanced a legitimate local purpose, and that no less discriminatory
alternatives were available.33 Michigan failed to meet this burden
because it could not show that out-of-state or out-of-county waste
was any more harmful than in-state or in-county waste." The Court
therefore struck down the Michigan regulations as an invalid exercise
of state power under the Commerce Clause.
35
130. See id. at 361.
131. See id.
132. See id.; see also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1951) (holding
that limits on a state are also limits on subdivisions of the state); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138
U.S. 78,82-84 (1891) (same).
133. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 366-67.
134. See id at 367. See generally Shaun Anderson, Comment, Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources: Solid Waste Management and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 758-81 (1994) (analyzing the
Court's decision in Fort Gratiot and concluding that the Court was moving firmly toward
the City of Philadelphia per se rule and away from the Pike balancing test); Christine E.
Carlstrom, Case Comment, Constitutional Law-State Law Banning Private Landfill's
Importation of Solid Waste Without County Authorization Violates Commerce Clause-
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 112
S. Ct. 2019 (1992), 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 203, 208-12 (1992) (analyzing the Court's
decision in Fort Gratiot and concluding that it "may... generate a disincentive for states
to engage in landfill conservation, since the states effectively must 'export' the benefit of
increased landfill capacity to less conscientious states"); Howard G. Hopkirk, Note, The
Future of Solid Waste Import Bans Under the Dormant Commerce Clause: Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
395, 409-16 (1993) (discussing the Court's decision and concluding that the decision in
Fort Gratiot could be a catalyst for adoption of a national solid waste management
program).
135. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367-68. Chief Justice Rehnquist again dissented and
argued that given the increased problem of waste management, states should be able to
enact legislation necessary to protect these important local interests. See il at 368
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court's decision
forced states with facilities to afford "reduced environmental and safety risks to the States
that will not take charge of their own waste." Id. at 369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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In a variation on the Alabama fee struck down in Chemical
Waste Management, Oregon attempted to impose a "compensatory
fee" on out-of-state waste disposed in Oregon. The fee was
designed to pass along the actual cost of disposal. 37 Oregon argued
that because the surcharge was expressly tied to the actual costs
incurred by state and local governments in disposal, it was a
constitutional "compensatory fee.""' In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc.
v. Department of Environmental Quality,39 the Supreme Court
rejected this distinction and held that the Oregon surcharge was
discriminatory on its face and therefore subject to the virtual per se
rule of invalidity.' Under this virtual per se rule, the Court found
The Chief Justice also repeated his arguments that garbage should be considered a
"noxious substance" that states could regulate under the quarantine laws. See id at 371-
72 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He also argued that as a matter of policy, "Ithe Court
today penalizes the State of Michigan for what to all appearances are its good-faith
efforts, in turn encouraging each State to ignore the waste problem in the hope that
another will pick up the slack." Id. at 373 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
136. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 95-97
(1994).
137. See id. at 95-96. The Court in Chemical Waste Management "left open the
possibility that such a differential surcharge might be valid if based on the costs of
disposing of waste from other States." Id at 95; see also Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334,346 n.9 (1992) (noting that a surcharge might be valid if based
on actual costs of disposal).
138. See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 97-98. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the
surcharge was a compensatory fee that was constitutional because compensatory fees are
invalid only if they are" 'manifestly disproportionate to the services rendered.'" Oregon
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 849 P.2d 500, 508 (Or. 1993) (quoting
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583,599 (1939)), rev'd, Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 97-98.
139. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
140. See id. at 99-100. The Court relied heavily on the decisions in Chemical Waste
Management, 504 U.S. at 342, and City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624,
626 (1978). The Court held that
even if the surcharge merely recoups the costs of disposing of out[-]of-state
waste in Oregon, the fact remains that the differential charge favors shippers of
Oregon waste over their counterparts handling waste generated in other States.
In making that geographic distinction, the surcharge patently discriminates
against interstate commerce.
Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100. Some commentators have criticized this decision. See
Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 43, 50-80, 84-85 (1995) (analyzing
the Court's opinion and arguing that the Court should have applied the Pike balancing
test and upheld the statute instead of requiring Congress to intervene to stop the "waste
wars"); Kristina Kelchner, Note, State Options Are Wasting Away: Oregon Waste
Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality and America's Solid Waste Crisis, 74
OR. L. REV. 1395, 1404-11 (1995) (analyzing the Court's decision and concluding that the
time has come for Congress to act to deal with the waste crisis in this country). But see
Susan Krisko, Note, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality: The Supreme Court Determines That State Surcharges on Out-of-State Generated
Waste Are Invalid, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1271, 1271-82 (1995) (discussing the facts of the
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that Oregon's statute was invalid since Oregon could not show a
legitimate local purpose that was not adequately served by less
discriminatory means. ' The Court found that the "compensatory
fee" was not equal to any similar surcharge on in-state commerce;
even if state income taxes were used to fund the facilities, those taxes
were too different to be considered substantially equivalent to the
surcharge.42 The Court also held that even if landfill space is
considered a" 'natural resource,' " Oregon" 'may not accord its own
inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States
to natural resources located within its borders.' "41 Oregon could not
charge more for disposal of out-of-state waste, even if the charge was
just passing along the actual costs of disposal. The Court therefore
closed off this small area left open in Chemical Waste Management
and ruled that Oregon's surcharge was invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause.TM
The most recent waste management case before the Supreme
Court involved local ordinances that put a twist on past legislation.
Legislation challenged in earlier cases typically prohibited the import
of out-of-state or out-of-county waste.'45 In C & A Carbone v.
Clarkstown,'TM the legislation involved "flow control" ordinances, or
"export bans," which required that all of the waste originating in a
particular county or area be sent to a specific waste treatment
case, analyzing the Court's decision, and concluding that the Court was correct in its
decision because "[s]tates should not be allowed to protect resources against other
states").
141. See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-07. The Court noted that "[t]he State's burden
of justification is so heavy that 'facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect.'" Id.
at 101 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,337 (1979)).
142. See id. at 102-04. To qualify as a valid "compensatory fee," the fee must be
substantially equivalent to some other in-state tax or fee. See id. at 103. There was no
such equivalent tax or fee in Oregon, and the Court determined that general income taxes
used to support the regulation or inspection of the facility were not substantially
equivalent. See id. at 104.
143. Id. at 107 (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627).
144. See id. at 108. Chief Justice Rehnquist again dissented, complaining that:
Once again, ... as in [City of] Philadelphia and Chemical Waste Management,
the Court further cranks the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet against the
States by striking down such cost-based fees, and by so doing ties the hands of
the States in addressing the vexing national problem of solid waste disposal.
Id. at 109 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that
"Oregon's neighbors will operate under a competitive advantage against their Oregon
counterparts as they can now produce solid waste with reckless abandon and avoid paying
concomitant state taxes to develop new landfills and clean up retired landfill sites." Id. at
112 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
145. See supra notes 84, 102, 125 and accompanying text.
146. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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facility.147 Local governments used these ordinances to guarantee that
a minimum amount of waste would be delivered to the specific
facility.1" The facility could charge a per-ton tipping fee, and the
local government could use the flow control ordinance and the
tipping fee to guarantee financing for construction of the facility.149
The town of Clarkstown, New York had such an ordinance, and the
town sued a recycling facility that was violating the ordinance and
taking its waste to facilities other than the designated town facility.15
The recycling facility sought to have the flow control ordinance
declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.'
The town argued that an export ban was different from the
import bans invalidated in prior cases." According to Clarkstown,
these export bans were not facially discriminatory and were
evenhanded because they treated in-state and out-of-state waste and
waste facilities the same.1" The ordinances required that no matter
where the waste was processed, if it originated in the town, it first had
to go through the town treatment and sorting facility." The Court
rejected this argument and held that the ordinance regulated
interstate commerce because the economic effects were interstate in
reach.5 The Court then held that the ordinance discriminated
against interstate commerce and thus was invalid under the Court's
rule in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.56 In applying the virtual
per se rule of invalidity, the Court noted that the health and safety
objectives of the town could be served through less discriminatory
alternatives such as uniform safety regulations, and the need to
finance new facilities could be subsidized through general taxes or
147. See id. at 386.
148. See id. at 386-87; David Stickney, Note, Throwing away "Flow Control": Effective
Solid Waste Management Succumbs to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 64 U. CIN. L. REv.
283,283-85 (1995).
149. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386-87.
150. See id. at 387-88.
151. See id. at 388.
152. See id. at 389.
153. See id. at 390.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 390-91. The Court noted that the flow control ordinance has the same
"design and effect" as import bans. See id. at 392. "It hoards solid waste, and the demand
to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." Id.
156. See id at 390, 392. The Court held that "[d]iscrimination against interstate
commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow class
of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no
other means to advance a legitimate local interest." Id. at 392.
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municipal bonds s7  Because the ordinances were facially
discriminatory and any legitimate local purpose could be served
through less discriminatory means, the Court held that the
ordinances were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
158
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the
ordinance was not facially discriminatory."' She agreed that the
ordinance was unconstitutional but urged that the proper test was the
balancing test used for facially neutral statutes with an incidental
effect on interstate commerce.' Justice O'Connor's concurrence
also directly addressed the argument raised by the National
Association of Bond Lawyers as amicus curiae that these flow control
ordinances were authorized by congressional action and therefore
should not be subject to dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 6'
157. See id, at 393-94.
158. See ld. at 386, 392-94. Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined. See id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter argued that this ordinance was not the sort of protectionist measure that
states enacted against one another and that "the majority is in fact greatly extending the
Clause's dormant reach." Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further argued
that the correct test was the balancing test under Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145
(1970), and he asserted that the ordinance should be upheld based on the important local
interests it served. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 422-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Several commentators also have criticized the Court's decision in Carbone. See
Rachel D. Baker, C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown: A Wake-up Call for the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 5 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 67,73-93 (1995) (analyzing the Court's
decision in Carbone, arguing that the Court should have applied the Pike balancing test
instead of the City of Philadelphia per se rule, and urging Congress to pass legislation to
authorize this type of state regulation); Howard E. Shapiro, C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown: Supreme Court Uses the Commerce Clause to Nix a Local Trash Flow-
Control Ordinance, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 20, 47 (1994) (concluding that the
Court's decision in Carbone will restrict the ability of local governments to finance private
facilities without raising taxes or increasing debt, and predicting that Congress will soon
act to allow such state activity); Stickney, supra note 148, at 293-318 (analyzing the
Court's decision, arguing that the Court should have used the Pike balancing test, and
arguing that RCRA provides congressional authorization for this action even if the action
violates the dormant Commerce Clause).
159. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
160. See id. at 401, 407 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). This balancing,
known as the Pike balancing test, applies to regulations that are not discriminatory but
that have an incidental effect on interstate commerce. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. The
balancing involves a comparison of the local benefits conferred and the excessiveness of
the burden on interstate trade. See id.; see also Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (describing the Pike balancing test).
161. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 407-08 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Although this argument was not raised by the parties to the action, Justice O'Connor
noted that this argument was "substantial" and considered it "appropriate to address it
directly." Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice O'Connor stated that RCRA did not provide authorization
for these state statutes because RCRA does not provide
"unmistakably clear" evidence that Congress intended to authorize
state action that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause."
Against this background of cases, it is not surprising that the
Fourth Circuit chose to follow the trend and hold in ETC that the
South Carolina import restrictions were invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause.163 The court followed the decision in City of
Philadelphia and noted that hazardous waste is commerce and is
subject to the limitations of the Commerce Clause.14 In addition, the
court followed the Supreme Court holdings in finding that South
Carolina's restrictions limiting import of waste solely on the basis of
origin were facially discriminatory and were subject to the City of
Philadelphia virtual per se rule of invalidity.6 Like earlier cases, the
162. Id. at 408-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The National
Association of Bond Lawyers ("NABL") pointed to provisions in RCRA that require
states to submit waste management plans to the EPA. See id. at 408-09 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(2) (1994) (setting forth the
waste requirements for state plans). These plans must not prohibit states or localities
from entering into long-term contracts for the supply of solid waste to facilities. See 42
U.S.C. § 6943(a)(5). A House Report addressing this provision noted that the section is
"not to be construed to affect state planning which may require all discarded materials to
be transported to a particular location." H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 34 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,6272. Justice O'Connor "agree[d] with amicus NABL that these
references indicate that Congress expected local governments to implement some form of
flow control. Nonetheless, they neither individually nor cumulatively rise to the level of
the 'explicit' authorization required by our dormant Commerce Clause decisions."
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 409 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor
invited Congress to authorize local authorities to enact this sort of legislation, but found
that current statutes showed no clear congressional intent to give states that authority.
See id, at 410 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
163. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 778-79.
164. See id. at 785-87.
165. See id. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit considered the balancing test and the per
se test in a similar case heard after the initial preliminary injunction but before the
ultimate grant of permanent injunction in ETC. See Chambers Med. Techs. of S.C., Inc.
v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1257, 1262-63 (4th Cir. 1995). In Chambers, the court considered
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a statute that set a cap on the amount of waste
that a commercial infectious waste incinerator could bum. See id. at 1255. The annual
limit was based on the amount of infectious waste generated in South Carolina. See id. at
1237. The court held that the cap did not discriminate on its face or in practical effect.
See id. at 1258. The statutes at issue were analogous to the statutes at issue in ETC. See
id. at 1255-57. In Chambers, the court held that tying the waste incineration limit to the
amount of in-state waste generated did not burden out-of-state producers any more than
in-state producers. See id. at 1258. The court also held that the analogous statute in ETC
was not part of the preliminary injunction issued in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council.
See id. at 1258 n.9. However, the court in ETC held that the per se rule applied, and the
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court analyzed the restrictions under the per se rule and found that
South Carolina had less discriminatory alternatives available.'"
Based on this analysis, the court granted a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the South Carolina laws.6 7 The dormant
Commerce Clause analysis was not surprising, given the recent
Supreme Court cases addressing waste management statutes subject
to Commerce Clause challenges.'"
It also was not surprising that the Fourth Circuit decided that
RCRA and SARA were not sufficiently explicit to constitute
congressional authorization of these discriminatory state statutes. 169
In the 1990 National Solid Waste Management7' case in Alabama, the
Eleventh Circuit confronted an almost identical argument in defense
of the Alabama "blacklisting" provision. 7' The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the argument and held that RCRA and SARA's
requirements of long-term capacity assurance were not clear or
explicit congressional authorization for discriminatory state
court attempted to distinguish its holding in Chambers. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 788 n.22.
The court in ETC argued that the cap in Chambers would violate the dormant Commerce
Clause if South Carolina failed to allow consideration of out-of-state waste in deciding
whether sufficient need was shown to allow construction of new facilities. See id.
166. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 786-87. The court examined each of South Carolina's
motivations. First, concern for the health and safety of citizens was a legitimate purpose,
but discrimination was not necessary to serve this purpose because "[h]azardous waste is
equally dangerous whether generated within South Carolina or out-of-state." Id. at 786.
Second, concern about preserving existing disposal capacity was not legitimate because
natural resources "may not be hoarded under the Commerce Clause." Id. Third,
concerns about transportation risks could be addressed by "neutral alternatives ...
regulating transportation of all hazardous waste regardless of origin." Id. Finally, South
Carolina argued it was "shouldering an unfair burden of the nation's hazardous wastes."
Id. However, the court stated that the "Commerce Clause does not purport to require
fairness among the states in interstate commerce." Id.
167. See id. at 787.
168. See supra notes 85-162 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). The
decision was not surprising because it followed the decisions of the Supreme Court and
other circuit courts decided during the past 10 years.
169. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 782-85. The Fourth Circuit examined RCRA, CERCLA, and
SARA and determined that there was not "unmistakably clear" congressional intent to
authorize discriminatory state legislation. See id.; see also supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text (discussing South Carolina's arguments and analyzing the court's
decision); supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's
treatment of this argument).
170. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), as modified upon denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d
1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
171. See id, at 721; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing the South
Carolina blacklisting provision in ETC); supra note 102 and accompanying text
(describing the Alabama provisions in National Solid Wastes Management).
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statutes.' The Supreme Court denied certiorari in National Solid
Waste Management 3 and later cited that Eleventh Circuit opinion in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt.74
The Eleventh Circuit decision was issued about a year before the
Fourth Circuit first heard the challenge to South Carolina's provision
in the preliminary injunction phase.75 In its opinion preliminarily
enjoining the enforcement of the South Carolina laws, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that
RCRA and SARA provide congressional authorization.' 7 The
Fourth Circuit chose to follow this decision of the Eleventh Circuit.'
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit similarly rejected the notion that
RCRA and SARA provided explicit congressional authorization for
discriminatory state statutes. The Fourth Circuit held that the
dormant Commerce Clause was therefore applicable, and not
surprisingly, the court adhered to this holding five years later in
granting the permanent injunction in ETC.79
In the most recent Supreme Court case addressing a Commerce
Clause challenge to waste management statutes, C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Town of Clarkstown, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
specifically addressed the issue of whether discriminatory state
statutes were authorized by RCRA.'" The majority did not address
172. See National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 721.
173. 501 U.S. 1206 (1991).
174. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340 n.3 (1992)
(describing hazardous waste as commerce and noting that "[t]he Commerce Clause thus
imposes some constraints on Alabama's ability to regulate these transactions").
175. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 781
(4th Cir. 1991). This opinion involved the same challenge to South Carolina's
discriminatory legislation as ETC but granted only a preliminary injunction. See iL The
permanent injunction based on the same general reasoning came five years later in ETC.
See ETC, 98 F.3d at 778.
176. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 791-92.
177. See id
178. See id, at 792.
179. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 783. The court adhered to its prior ruling and noted:
We previously found at the preliminary injunction stage that RCRA, CERCLA,
and SARA did not contain any language indicating "an unmistakably clear
congressional intent to permit states to burden interstate commerce." Neither
South Carolina, nor the intervenors have come forward with any further
persuasive evidence indicating that Congress intended to permit the states,
directly or by EPA authorization, to engage in actions otherwise violative of the
Commerce Clause.
ETC, 98 F.3d at 783 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 792).
180. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 407-10 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 145-62 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts of Carbone and the Court's opinion).
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the issue because it was raised only by an amicus curiae rather than a
party to the action.18 ' Justice O'Connor specifically noted that
RCRA did not authorize states to enact flow control ordinances that
interfered with interstate commerce.' Despite some evidence of
intent, Justice O'Connor concluded that RCRA did not include
"explicit" authorization of such actions.1 3 Although this was not part
of the majority opinion, the Fourth Circuit in ETC was unlikely to
reverse itself to find authorization when Justice O'Connor had found
no such authorization in a separate provision of RCRA.
The opinions and statutory interpretations by the Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits are confirmed by later
political struggles to enact legislation specifically granting states the
power to control waste at their borders. The circuit courts
determined that Congress did not expressly authorize discriminatory
state statutes that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.'"
During the early 1990s, congressional delegates repeatedly
introduced legislation to specifically authorize state and local officials
to enact these sorts of waste management plans even if they
discriminated against interstate commerce."a However, none of these
181. See id. at 407-08 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that this
argument was raised by amicus NABL); supra note 161 and accompanying text.
182. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor noted a
statement in the House Report addressing 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(5) (1994), the section of
RCRA at issue in Carbone, showing some evidence of concern with flow control. See
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 409 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The House Report
noted that state planning "may require all discarded materials to be transported to a
particular location." H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 34 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6238, 6272. Despite these indications of intent, which provided more evidence than South
Carolina had in the separate provisions at issue in ETC, Justice O'Connor still argued that
the language was not explicit enough to indicate congressional intent to authorize
discriminatory statutes. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
184. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 792; National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713,721 (11th Cir.
1990), as modified upon denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
185. See S. 2345,103d Cong. (1994) (granting authority to governors to freeze the level
of solid waste imports); H.R. 4779, 103d Cong. (1994) (granting state and local
governments some control over import of solid waste); S. 439, 103d Cong. (1993)
(allowing states to ban the import of out-of-state waste); H.R. 1076, 103d Cong. (1993)
(same); H.R. 963, 103d Cong. (1993) (same); H.R. 3865, 102d Cong. (1992) (amending
RCRA to allow states to ban the import of out-of-state waste to new facilities that they
construct); S. 2877, 102d Cong. (1992) (allowing states with local waste planning units
whose landfills met all operating requirements to ban the import of out-of-state waste and
freeze existing import levels); S. 976, 102d Cong. § 4014 (1992) (giving states the authority
to ban out-of-state waste as part of RCRA reauthorization); H.R. 2162, 101st Cong.
(1989) (giving states the right to ban out-of-state waste if the import ban was part of a
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bills was ever enacted, and each involved a political battle.1" This
inability to pass legislation authorizing discriminatory state statutes
lends some support to the notion that Congress did not intend to
authorize such statutes when it enacted SARA in 1986.
The position of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits is also
supported by the presence of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy statutes.' These statutes are similar to the provisions of
RCRA but govern the handling and disposal of radioactive waste
rather than hazardous waste.18' As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in
National Solid Wastes Management,89 Congress explicitly included a
provision in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act that
authorized states to enact discriminatory provisions even if they
would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.1" The statute
envisioned interregional compacts for radioactive waste disposal that
could be enforced by states through statutes refusing to import waste
from non-member states."' There is no such analogous provision in
comprehensive, EPA-approved solid waste management plan). The Report on Senate
Bill 976 explicitly acknowledged that the provision was a specific delegation of power to
regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause. See S. REP. No. 102-301, at 80 (1992).
186. See Fitzgerald, supra note 140, at 80-84. House Bill 4779 passed the House by a
vote of 368-55. See id. However, the Senate's version, Senate Bill 2345, differed in the
amount of power given to governors. See id. The House approved a compromise bill, but
the Senate rejected it. See id. A few years earlier, Senate Bill 2877 passed quickly in the
Senate. See Martin E. Gold, Solid Waste Management and the Constitutuion's Commerce
Clause, 25 URB. LAW. 21, 48 n.144 (1993). However, similar legislation was proposed in
the House of Representatives but died when the House adjourned without taking action.
See id.
187. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1994); see also Tomko, supra note 100, at 298-300
(comparing the statutes governing Low-Level Radioactive Waste with the statutes
governing Capacity Assurance Plans, and arguing that the punishment for violating an
agreement pursuant to the CAPs is loss of Superfund money, not being banned from
other states' hazardous waste facilities).
18& See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste provisions were
validated, in part, by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169-
73 (1992) (holding that monetary and access incentives were legitimate exercises of the
Commerce Clause authority). However, the Court invalidated the provision requiring
states to "take title" to waste. See id. at 171-73 (holding that these provisions exceeded
Commerce Clause authority and interfered with state sovereignty).
189. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713, 722 n.12 (11th Cir. 1990), as modified upon denial of reh'g,
924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
190. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act encourages states to enter into
regional compacts and explicitly authorizes states to ban the import of radioactive waste
from states that do not enter into a compact or do not meet federal deadlines for
establishing their own facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2), (0(1) (1994).
191. North Carolina entered into a regional compact under the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act with other southeastern states including South Carolina.
See Richard S. Hodes, Waste Compact Will Benefit North Carolina, CHARLOTTE
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RCRA or SARA, lending further support to the notion that
discriminatory state actions were not authorized by Congress under
those statutes.
After holding that Congress had not authorized the
discriminatory statutes, the court in ETC moved to a procedural
problem challenging the court's right to hear the case."n The Fourth
Circuit held that the trial court did not err in refusing to defer to the
EPA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." This jurisdictional
issue was not addressed in the earlier Fourth Circuit case granting the
preliminary injunction1 and had not been addressed in any early
Commerce Clause challenge to waste management statutes. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction generally provides that the agency
with expertise in a specialized area should have authority to decide a
controversy 95 RCRA and SARA require states to submit waste
management plans to the EPA."' The EPA reviews the plans to
make sure they are "consistent" with federal law and other state
plans.1" After City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the EPA required
OBSERVER, July 6, 1992, at A7; Nuclear Storage Sought, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, June
24, 1995, at C1. When North Carolina refused to meet its obligations under this act,
South Carolina banned all importation of low-level radioactive waste from North
Carolina. See Hodes, supra, at A7. Unlike the hazardous waste ban, the radioactive
waste ban was specifically authorized by Congress, and North Carolina was left to fend
for itself. See id.; see also Radioactive Waste: Southeast Compact Agrees in Principle with
Generators' Offer to Provide Funds, 28 ENV'T REP. 782 (1997) (noting that since South
Carolina barred importation of radioactive waste, "low-level waste from power
generation, industrial processes, and medical research and treatment is stored at
approximately 40 sites in North Carolina").
192. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 789.
193. See id
194. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 789
n.11 (4th Cir. 1991).
195. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 789. See supra note 60 for a brief discussion of primary
jurisdiction.
196. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of
RCRA and SARA).
197. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (1996). This regulation requires that state plans not restrict
interstate trade, but the EPA has altered its definition over time to allow plans that would
not be allowed under the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis. See Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 793-94. The regulation provides:
To obtain approval, a State program must be consistent with the Federal
program and State programs applicable in other States and in particular must
comply with the provisions below...
(a) Any aspect of the State program which unreasonably restricts, impedes,
or operates as a ban on the free movement across the State border of
hazardous wastes from or to other States for treatment, storage, or disposal
at facilities authorized to operate under the Federal or an approved State
program shall be deemed inconsistent.
40 C.F.R. § 271.4.
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that the state plans fall within the constraints of the dormant
Commerce Clause. 9' State plans that improperly burdened interstate
commerce were deemed "not consistent" with federal law."
However, this EPA definition changed over time, and the EPA
approved South Carolina's waste plan as "consistent" with federal
law despite the limitations on waste import and the burden on
interstate commerce.2m
The trial court chose not to defer to the EPA and held that the
Commerce Clause issues were legal rather than factual.20' The trial
court found that it was in a better position than the EPA to
determine the constitutionality of the waste statutes because it was an
Article III court and thus more familiar with constitutional issues.'
The Fourth Circuit reviewed this decision for abuse of discretion but
agreed that the trial court did not need to defer to the EPA under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' The Fourth Circuit agreed that the
EPA was in no better position than the federal courts to determine
the constitutionality of the provision and agreed that the court need
not defer to the EPA on legal issues when the facts were not really
contested.0 The Fourth Circuit's holding divests state and local
governments of the ability to get a plan approved by the EPA under
its definition of what is "consistent" with federal law. Like other
recent precedent, the Fourth Circuit's holding further limits the
power of state and local governments to enact these sorts of
provisions, even with EPA approval.
ETC has important practical ramifications because it allows
North Carolina to continue sending its hazardous waste to South
Carolina even though North Carolina refused to meet its obligations
under the interregional agreement.2" After ETC, North Carolina at
least has a place to send its waste while it determines the appropriate
198. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 793-94.
199. See id.
200. See id The EPA raised a concern about the constitutionality of this provision,
and the South Carolina Attorney General responded and argued that the provisions were
constitutional. See id
201. See Environmental Tech. Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1029
(D.S.C. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Environmental Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
202. See id.
203. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 789.
204. See id
205. Cf. Lee Bandy, EPA: States Mustn't Erect Walls Against Shipments of Waste,
CHARLoTrE OBSERVER (S.C. Edition), May 1, 1991, at B1 (discussing South Carolina's
attempts to prohibit the importation of North Carolina's waste); Judge Blocks S.C. Ban
on N.C. Waste Disposal, supra note 22, at B1 (same).
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solution to the hazardous waste problem. However, the hazardous
waste problems remain and the "wars" are likely to continue. Like
the Eleventh Circuit had done in National Solid Wastes Management,
the Fourth Circuit disclaimed responsibility for its decision, noting at
the outset that it had to apply the Constitution despite the effect on
hazardous waste policy. 6
The Constitution itself thus "interferes" with hazardous waste
management.Y The cases show that the Supreme Court and the
lower courts have consistently applied the dormant Commerce
Clause to invalidate state legislation that attempts to limit the import
of waste from other states." Absent congressional authorization to
burden interstate commerce, the dormant Commerce Clause bars
these "import bans." The Fourth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit
both have held that RCRA and SARA do not constitute explicit
congressional authorization to burden interstate commerce, so the
dormant Commerce Clause operates to invalidate discriminatory
hazardous waste regulation!"1 However, although Congress has not
acted to authorize "import bans," Congress has created a scheme
under SARA to force states to take responsibility for hazardous
waste planning.
21
'
Under SARA, the EPA is authorized to withhold Superfund
money from any state that is unable to demonstrate long-term
disposal capacity for waste generated in-state. 12 To demonstrate
long-term disposal capacity, states must show adequate in-state
206. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 783
(4th Cir. 1991). The court disclaimed responsibility for the implications of its decision by
stating:
"[O]ur job is not to make policy, but to interpret the federal legislation and
regulations to determine Congress's intent .... We recognize that serious
problems associated with hazardous waste management plague our nation; but
whatever our own views may be about the effectiveness of what Congress or
Alabama has done, we can only apply the law."
1d. (second alteration in original) (quoting National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v.
Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 715-16 (11th Cir. 1990), as modified
upon denial ofreh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991)).
207. See id.
208. See supra notes 85-162 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state waste management statutes).
209. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 782; see also supra note 66 (discussing the rule that Congress
may act to authorize state action that would otherwise interfere with the dormant
Commerce Clause).
210. See ETC, 98 F.3d at 782-85; National Solid Wastes Management, 910 F.2d at 721,
723.
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1994).
212. See id
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capacity or must enter into interstate agreements assuring long-term
disposal capacity.213  After failing to meet its obligations, North
Carolina was eliminated from its interstate agreement.214 South
Carolina's- governor pushed the EPA to impose the statutory
sanctions and withhold Superfund money.215 The EPA Administrator
agreed that the EPA should withhold $12 million in Superfund
money if North Carolina failed to demonstrate disposal capacity."6
This was the appropriate sanction provided by Congress for states
that failed to meet their hazardous waste management obligations.2 7
However, in 1992 the EPA changed its interpretation of this
statutory requirement."' States were facing difficulty meeting the
capacity assurance requirements of SARA. 9 In response to this
difficulty and the lack of precise data, the EPA decided to consider
the availability of disposal capacity on a national basis, rather than
state-by-state.t m Under this interpretation, the EPA considers all of
the disposal capacity available throughout the country."1 The EPA
then considers each state's estimate of its expected waste.2m  The
213. See id.; see also supra note 39 (quoting the relevant portion of SARA).
214. See Campbell Letter, supra note 1.
215. See County Torn over Hazardous Waste Facility as North Carolina Searches State
for Location, supra note 9, at 1840.
216. See North Carolina Amends Capacity Plan; EPA to Decide on Yanking Superfund
Money, 22 ENV'T REP. 113, 113 (1991); North Carolina Given 60 Days to Site Hazardous
Waste Facility, 21 ENV'T REP. 2028,2028 (1991).
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9).
218. See Draft Guidance Bases State Waste Capacity on Treatmen4 Disposal
Availability Nationwide, 23 ENV'T REP. 1466, 1466 (1992).
219. See Capacity Assurance Plans for States Termed 'Paper Exercise' by Illinois
Official, 20 ENV'T REP. 1267, 1267-68 (1989) (arguing that the plans were particularly
unreliable because states have no control over management decisions by private
commercial hazardous waste facilities). The EPA also faced criticism when it approved
state capacity assurance plans that relied on capacity at a New York facility without New
York's approval. See Capacity Assurance Plans Inadequate, New York Says in Filing Suit
Against EPA, 22 ENV'T REP. 2099,2099 (1992).
220. See Draft Guidance Bases State Waste Capacity on Treatment, Disposal
Availability Nationwide, supra note 218, at 1466; see also Availability of the Draft 1993
Guidance for Capacity Assurance Planning, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,496, at 41,496 (1992) (noting
that the new guidance "presents a national approach that focuses on sufficient capacity to
treat and dispose of the projected demand of hazardous wastes").
221. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT
REPORr. CAPACITY PLANNING PURSUANT TO CERCLA SECTION 104(c)(9), at 5 (1997)
(noting that the CAP process focused on national capacity and that "[fin evaluating
capacity nationwide, the Agency assumes private agreements for the interstate treatment
or disposal of hazardous waste have been or will be executed if adequate capacity
otherwise exists").
222. See id. at 4 (noting that the EPA "calculated the total national maximum demand
... by aggregating the States' projected demand and commercial capacity").
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EPA then compares the total available capacity with the total
projected waste generated on a national basis.' The EPA recently
made this comparison and found that there was sufficient national
capacity through the year 2013.4 Based on this determination, the
EPA found that no Superfund money would be withheld.'
This interpretation removes any incentive for states to enter into
agreements or build facilities as part of long-term hazardous waste
management plans. Congress enacted sanctions to prevent states like
North Carolina from shirking their obligations." However, the EPA
has adopted a strained interpretation that removes any real bite from
the statute.m The result is that states without facilities get a free ride
at the expense of the states with facilities. States without facilities are
spared the economic and political costs of trying to construct a waste
facility to deal with the waste they generate. Instead, they have used
the courts to force other states to accept their waste, and the EPA
has refused to impose the statutory sanctions. Less-populated states
have become the "dumping grounds" for the nation's hazardous
waste, and states without facilities are given no incentives or
requirements to build their own facilities.
Given the position of the courts and of the EPA, states are
limited in their ability to force other states to take care of their own
waste. However, states with facilities can try to solve the problem
through a few methods that have not yet been challenged. If the
state owns the facility, it is exempt from the application of the
dormant Commerce Clause under the "market participant
doctrine,"m and it may decide what waste can be disposed there.
223. See id.
224. See id.; see also CERCLA 104(c)(9) Capacity Assurance Planning: National
Capacity Assessment Report, 62 Fed. Reg. 2156, 2156 (1997) (concluding that "there
exists adequate national capacity in all CAP management categories").
225. See CERCLA 104(c)(9) Capacity Assurance Planning: National Capacity
Assessment Report, 62 Fed. Reg. at 2156 (noting that as a result of the determination,
"all States continue to be eligible to receive Superfund Trust funds").
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1994).
227. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
228. For additional discussion and analysis of the "market participant doctrine," see
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206.08
(1983). See also David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The
Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste
Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1312-28, 1331-48 (1989) (examining the contours of the
market participant doctrine and the ways state and local governments could use this
doctrine to control waste disposal). See generally Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the
Market Participation Exception, 15 WHITIER L. REv. 647 (1994) (criticizing the
justifications of and exceptions to the market participation doctrine, and discussing the
significance of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
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States also may contract with local private facilities to guarantee a
certain capacity for in-state waste each year. 9 This option places the
burden on the state to spend tax dollars to regulate, inspect, and
support the facility. In addition, the state must spend additional
money to contract space for in-state waste at a premium. However,
this option at least provides some certainty that the state will be able
to assure long-term disposal capacity.
In order to provide a solution to this problem, Congress could
enact a statute modeled after the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act. This statute could encourage states to enter into regional
compacts for the disposal of hazardous waste and could explicitly
authorize states to ban the import of hazardous waste from states
that did not enter into a compact or did not meet federal deadlines
for establishing their own facilities!" Such a statute would give states
power to control waste flow and would provide greater incentives to
states to enter regional agreements and live up to their obligations.
However, there are problems with such an approach. First, states
might close their borders, instigating a hazardous waste crisis in
which states without facilities would be left with no immediate
disposal options. This would undermine Congress's goal of ensuring
safe disposal of hazardous waste. Second, such an arrangement
would lead to state isolation and would run contrary to the notion
that as a union, the states must "sink or swim together." 21 Finally,
some states might still fail to comply with their hazardous waste
obligations.0 2
As a better alternative, the EPA should change its loose
interpretation of the capacity assurance program under SARA.
Congress has provided stringent sanctions for states that fail to meet
their hazardous waste planning obligations.' Under the current
requirements of SARA, states that fail to demonstrate long-term
229. Cf National Solid Wastes Management v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management,
910 F.2d 713, 720 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that Alabama could meet the requirements of
the capacity assurance plan by contracting with a private facility for capacity), as modified
upon denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
230. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b - 2021j (setting out the requirements and authority under
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act).
231. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935) ("[The Constitution] was
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.").
232. For example, North Carolina has failed to comply with its obligations under the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act. See supra note 191.
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9).
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disposal capacity should lose Superfund money.2M However, under
the EPA's interpretation of this statute, states are not individually
accountable and every state has continued to receive Superfund
money.' The EPA should use its statutory authority to impose
sanctions against states like North Carolina that fail to meet their
obligations under a regional agreement and fail to demonstrate long-
term hazardous waste disposal capacity. This alternative would
prevent states from isolating themselves, and would force recalcitrant
states to live up to their obligations.
States will have to work together to solve the national hazardous
waste problem. As long as some states are free to burden other
states with their waste at no additional cost, it is unlikely that states
will join together or create a compromise. Congress has created
statutory sanctions to prevent this situation, but the hazardous waste
wars will continue to escalate as long as the EPA refuses to use the
statutory tools that Congress has provided. The EPA has the power
to force states to build necessary hazardous waste facilities despite
local opposition. By refusing to use this power, the EPA just
contributes to the problem. Despite the EPA's position, North
Carolina must take responsibility and cooperate in establishing
solutions to the hazardous waste problem rather than shirking
obligations at South Carolina's expense.
Joi ELIZABETH PEAKE
234. See id.; see also supra note 39 (quoting the relevant portion of SARA).
235. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's
interpretation of the capacity assurance plan requirements).
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